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1. Introduction 
 
The recent financial crisis brought to the fore the debate about the bank lending channel of 
monetary policy transmission. Traditional macroeconomic models such as the IS-LM 
representation assume that monetary policy affects the real economic activity by changing 
interest rates which, in turn, affects the investment demand of the firms. However, this line of 
argument has increasingly come under scrutiny.
1
 To begin with, evidence suggests that 
investment decisions of firms are affected much more by factors such as cash flows than by 
the cost of borrowing (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Evidence also suggests that banks are not 
passive intermediaries between the central bank and end users of money such as the firms. For 
example, in an early discussion of this issue, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) demonstrate that 
the composition of banks’ portfolios change systematically in response to monetary policy 
initiatives. They conclude that the impact of monetary policy on the investment of firms is not 
entirely demand driven, and that at least part of it can be explained by the supply side or the 
bank lending channel. Kashyap and Stein (1993) demonstrate that if a central bank pursues 
tighter monetary policy, there is a decline in the amount of bank loans to firms and 
simultaneously a rise in the issuance of commercial paper, and conclude that contractionary 
monetary policy reduces loan supply. 
 
                                                 
1
 There are a number of attempts to theoretically extend the IS-LM framework to a multi-asset 
framework with imperfect substitutability among the assets. As such, the lending channel 
view of monetary policy is a special case of these extended frameworks, with money, bonds 
and loans as three imperfectly substitutable assets (Kashyap and Stein, 1995). 
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Importantly, research suggests that there might be significant heterogeneity in the reaction of 
banks to monetary policy initiatives. It may, for example, depend on the extent of competition 
in the banking sector. Olivero, Li and Jeon (2011) argue that an increase in competition in the 
banking sector weakens the transmission mechanism of monetary policy through the bank 
lending channel.  
 
Banks’ reaction to monetary policy initiatives also depends on the quality of their balance 
sheets. Peek and Rosengren (1995) argue that an important determinant of a bank’s reaction 
would be its capital-to-asset ratio. If banks find it difficult (or expensive) to raise capital, for 
example, they could be reluctant to lend even if there is ample demand for credit in the 
aftermath of easing of monetary policy. This hypothesis finds support in the empirical 
literature. Kishan and Opiela (2000) find that small and undercapitalised banks are most 
affected by monetary policy. Gambacorta (2005) too finds that lending of undercapitalized 
Italian banks is adversely affected by contractionary monetary policy, even though lending is 
not correlated with bank size. Further, there is a directional asymmetry in the impact of 
monetary policy on the lending behaviour of undercapitalised banks (Kishan and Opiela, 
2006). In the event of contractionary monetary policy, there is a sharp tightening in loan 
disbursal by undercapitalised banks, but in the event of an expansionary monetary policy 
there is no corresponding expansion of credit disbursal.  
 
The reaction of banks to monetary policy also depends on the composition of their assets. The 
traditional or money view of monetary policy transmission assumes that all asset classes are 
perfect substitutes of each other. If, therefore, contractionary monetary policy leads to a 
reduction in deposits, a bank is capable of substituting for this loss of deposits dollar for 
dollar, using other assets like CDs, such that loan supply is not affected. Stein (1998) argues 
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that, contrary to this view, assets included in a bank’s balance sheet are not perfect substitutes. 
For example, since deposits are guaranteed by the FDIC (or its overseas counterpart), while 
CDs are not, there may be adverse selection in the market for CDs, such that banks do not use 
these instruments to compensate for loss of deposits dollar for dollar. This results in a decline 
in loan supply. It follows that banks that have less liquid assets such that they cannot quickly 
and costlessly compensate for loss of deposits in the event of contractionary monetary policy 
or, alternatively, those that cannot raise funds quickly to the same end, would react more to 
monetary policy changes. Kashyap and Stein (2000) find that monetary policy has greater 
impact on loan supply of banks with low securities-to-assets ratios. 
 
The literature does not, however, empirically examine the impact of bank ownership on the 
lending channel of monetary policy transmission.
2
 This is hardly surprising, given that much 
of the literature is based on the United States and Western European experiences,
3
 where 
private ownership of banks overwhelmingly dominates. However, as pointed out by La Porta 
et al. (2000), state-ownership of banks is ubiquitous in much of the world, especially in 
emerging economies. Indeed, the 2007-09 financial crisis has led to significant state 
ownership of banking assets even in developed countries such as the United Kingdom, and 
concerns about the lending activities of the de facto nationalised banks have brought into 
                                                 
2
 Andries and Billion (2010) develop a theoretical model that demonstrates that state-owned 
banks are more able to counteract restrictive monetary policy because they have greater 
capability to raise additional deposits. 
3
 See, for example,  the following related recent studies focusing on Western European 
countries: Altunbaş, Fazylov and Molyneux (2002); Huang (2003); Hülsewig, Mayer and 
Wollmershäuser (2006); De Graeve, De Jonghe
 
and Vennet (2007); and Dovern, Carsten-
Patrick and Vilsmeier (2010) 
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focus the impact of bank ownership on the lending channel in the developed country context 
as well. In this paper, we address this lacuna in the literature, and examine whether the impact 
of monetary policy on lending differs across banks with different ownerships.  
 
Studying how bank ownership plays a role in the credit channel of monetary policy 
transmission is important because public sector banks account for a significant portion of the 
banking assets and loan portfolio emerging economies, and, at the same time, many of these 
countries are fiscally constrained such that monetary policy may be the only instrument 
available to policy makers to induce growth. This indeed is currently the situation in a wide 
range of developed countries as well. Our analysis provides an empirical basis for this policy 
debate concerning the relative effectiveness of monetary policy when a significant proportion 
of the banking sector is under state ownership.
4
 This is one of the key contributions of the 
paper. Further, by isolating the response of foreign-owned banks, it adds to the small but 
growing literature on the impact of foreign banks on credit growth, especially in emerging 
economies context.  
 
Our second important contribution is that we separately examine the reaction of different 
types of banks (i.e., private, state and foreign) in easy and tight monetary policy regimes. As 
mentioned earlier, reaction of banks to monetary policy changes may be asymmetric: a 
                                                 
4
 Note, for example, the public policy debate in the United Kingdom, an industrialised 
economy, where two large banks are currently in public ownership. The easy monetary stance 
adopted by the Bank of England has not resulted in credit growth to the desired extent, and 
there is an on-going debate about the role of these nationalised banks in delinking 
expansionary monetary policy and credit growth, at a time when economic growth is perhaps 
of greater importance than inflation targeting.  
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change in interest rates might have very different outcomes, depending on whether these rates 
are low or high to begin with. If an asymmetry does exist, a greater understanding of the 
differences in the impact of monetary policy in easy and tight money regimes would be 
imperative for successful monetary policy interventions. The richness of our contribution is 
enhanced by the fact that, for each of these monetary policy regimes, we estimate the reaction 
of the different types of banks based on ownership.  
 
Finally, we examine whether impact of monetary policy differs with respect to different 
maturities, and hence riskiness, of lending activities. Specifically, we examine the impact of 
monetary policy on disbursal of (more risky) medium term credit and (less risky) short term 
credit. We estimate the impact for tight and easy monetary regimes, and also for the different 
types of banks.  
 
We use bank-level data from India to examine these issues. We focus on India for several 
reasons. First, India is a fast growing emerging market that embraced the market economy in 
the early nineties and has since liberalised its economy substantially. Importantly, in the 
absence of a well developed market for corporate bonds,
5
 banks are by far the largest source 
of credit for Indian companies,
6
 and hence bank lending plays an important role in the 
transmission of monetary policy in India. Second, the Indian banking sector is also marked by 
the presence of a number of state-owned and private-owned (including foreign) banks, who 
compete on a level playing field. Third, the state-owned banks themselves have autonomy 
regarding lending decisions, and many of them have sold shares to private (and even foreign) 
                                                 
5
 Corporate bonds account for only 3 percent of the Indian bond market. 
6
 Domestic credit provided by banking sector increased from 44.1 percent of GDP in 1995 to 
64.2 percent of GDP in 2007 (Source: World Bank Development Indicators). 
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shareholders, thereby opening themselves up to greater scrutiny. Indeed, Indian state-owned 
banks resemble the de facto nationalised banks of the United Kingdom much more closely 
than state-owned banks in former transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (see, 
e.g., Bonin and Wachtel, 2002). The state maintains an arms-length relationship with the 
banks in which they have majority (or complete) ownership, such that these banks are 
autonomous and focussed on profitability.
7
 In that respect, the state-owned and privately-
owned banks are similar, and hence the presumption of profit focus that underlies the analyses 
of banks in the stylised literature is applicable to all Indian banks. There are, nevertheless, 
important differences between state-owned and privately-owned banks in terms of their 
customer base (Berger et al., 2008), and also in terms of factors that affect their lending 
(Bhaumik and Piesse, 2008). Therefore, there are likely to be differences in ways in which the 
state-owned and privately-owned banks react to monetary policy initiatives of India’s central 
bank, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). 
 
Our results indicate that banks of different ownership types respond very differently to 
monetary policies in different monetary regimes. During periods of tight monetary policy, 
state-owned banks, old private banks and foreign banks curtail credit in response to an 
increase in interest rate. The reaction of foreign banks is particularly sharp. The reactions of 
the new private banks are not statistically significant. By contrast, during easy money periods, 
an increase in interest rates by the central bank leads to an increase in the growth of credit 
disbursed by old private banks, with no significant reactions from other types of banks. Our 
                                                 
7
 The state-owned banks are somewhat less efficient than their privately owned counterparts 
(Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003). However, evidence suggests that, contrary to the popular 
wisdom about state-owned companies, ownership does not significantly affect profitability of 
Indian banks (Sarkar, Sarkar and Bhaumik, 1998; Bhaumik and Dimova, 2004). 
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study also suggests that monetary policy initiatives have different implications for (less risky) 
short term lending and (relatively more risky) medium term lending. Monetary tightening in a 
tight money regime adversely affects both short term and medium term lending, especially by 
foreign banks. But a similar policy initiative in an easy money regime actually increases short 
term lending, without having an effect on medium term lending. We argue that to a significant 
extent the behaviour of the different types of banks in the two different monetary regimes can 
be explained by their closeness to (and hence the extent of informational asymmetry with 
respect to) their borrower base.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the banking 
system and the operation of monetary policy in India. Section 3 explains the empirical 
methodology and the model specification, and discusses the data. The results are discussed in 
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Banking sector and monetary policy in India 
2.1. Banking sector 
 
Independent India inherited a weak financial system. Commercial banks mobilized household 
savings through demand and term deposits, and disbursed the credit primarily to large 
corporations. This lop-sided pattern of credit disbursal, and perhaps a spate of bank failures 
that reduced the number of banks from 566 in 1951 to 90 in 1968, led the government to 
nationalize the banks in 1969. The main thrust of nationalization was social banking, with the 
stated objective of increasing the geographical coverage of the banking system, and extension 
of credit to the priority sector that comprised largely of agriculture, agro-processing, and 
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small-scale industries. This phase of banking in India was characterized by administered 
interest rates, mandatory syndicated lending, and pre-emption of the banks’ deposit base by 
the government in the form of measures like high cash reserve ratio (CRR) and statutory 
liquidity ratio (SLR). Banks were required to invest a significant proportion of their deposits 
in bonds issued by the government and “approved” (quasi-government) institutions. At the 
same time, between 1969 and 1990, the nationalized banks added over 55,000 branches to 
their network. 
 
While the social agenda of the banking sector, measured in terms of geographical and sectoral 
coverage, was arguably a success, the Indian banking sector, about 88 percent of whose assets 
were managed by state-owned banks, was in distress. While the ratio of gross operating profit 
of the scheduled commercial banks rose from 0.8 percent (of assets) in the seventies to 1.5 
percent in the early nineties, the net profit of the banks declined. More importantly, perhaps, 
financial repression involving state-owned banks was not in harmony with the agenda of real 
sector reforms that the government of India unleashed in the aftermath of the balance of 
payments crisis of 1991. The RBI, therefore, initiated reform of the banking sector in 1992, 
based on the recommendations of Narasimham Committee I. 
 
Between 1992 and 1997, the CRR was reduced from 15 percent to about 10 percent, and the 
SLR was reduced from 38.5 percent to 25 percent over the same period. The interest rates 
were gradually liberalized. Prior to 1992, the lending rates structure consisted of six 
categories based on the size of advances. During the 1992-94 period, the lending rates 
structure was rationalised to three categories, and in 1994 banks were given the freedom to 
determine interest rates on all loans exceeding 200,000 Indian rupees (INR). By 1998, banks 
were free to determine the interest rates for all loans, with the understanding that the lending 
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rates on loans up to INR 200,000 would not exceed the declared prime lending rates (PLR) of 
the banks. 
 
Prior to the initiation of reforms, banks were required to refer all loans above a size threshold 
to the RBI for authorization, and formation of a consortium was mandatory for all loans 
exceeding INR 50 million. Bank credit was delivered primarily in the form of cash credit for 
use as working capital, and there were significant restrictions on the ability of banks to deliver 
term credit for projects. Finally, the RBI implemented selective credit controls on “sensitive” 
commodities.   
 
In the wake of the reforms, as early as in 1993, the threshold for the mandatory formation of 
consortiums was raised tenfold from INR 50 million to INR 500 million. Further, banks 
within consortiums were permitted to frame the rules or contractual agreements governing the 
consortium lending. In 1996, selective credit controls on all sensitive commodities except 
sugar were removed. Banks were also allowed much greater flexibility about the proportion of 
the cash credit component of the loans, the new floor being 25 percent. The following year 
witnessed further elimination of credit controls: Banks were no longer subjected to the 
instructions pertaining to Maximum Permissible Bank Finance (MPBF), and were allowed to 
evolve their own methods for assessing the credit needs of the potential borrowers. Further, 
banks were no longer required to form consortiums to lend in excess of INR 500 million, and 
restrictions on their ability to provide term loan for projects were withdrawn. However, 
prudential regulations required that an individual bank not be over-exposed to any one (or 
group of) creditor(s). 
 
Finally, in 1998, the RBI initiated the second generation of banking reforms, in keeping with 
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the recommendations of Narasimham Committee II. The most important recommendation of 
the Committee was the creation of asset reconstruction companies (ARCs) to simultaneously 
improve the quality of the balance sheets of the banks and to facilitate recovery of loans. In a 
separate development, after a prolonged period of legal disputes, debt recovery tribunals 
(DRTs) began functioning in India, in earnest, by 1999.  
 
To summarize, by 1996, banks operating in India, were, by and large, in a position to take 
independent decisions on the composition of their asset portfolio, and on the choice of 
potential borrowers. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that these banks, including the 
state-owned ones, allocate resources in a way that was consistent with optimization of risk-
return tradeoffs. There are, however, significant differences across credit market behaviour of 
banks of different ownership. Berger et al. (2008) find that comparative advantage of Indian 
banks, with respect to relationship with potential borrowers, vary considerably with 
ownership. State-owned banks typically have banking relationship with small firms, state-
owned firms and rural firms, domestic private banks have comparative advantage with respect 
to opaque closely held firms, and foreign banks have banking relationship with large, listed 
and foreign firms. The likelihood of adverse selection, therefore, varies considerably across 
banks, by ownership type. Bhaumik and Piesse (2008) demonstrate that bank ownership also 
has an impact on risk aversion among Indian banks, with foreign banks being significantly 
more risk averse than domestic banks. Finally, state-owned banks retained, in principle, the 
ability to raise capital without being exposed to market forces. Since the impact of monetary 
policy on bank lending depends in large measure on the risk of adverse selection the extent of 
risk aversion of banks, and also on their ability to raise affordable capital, we expect to see 
considerable differences in the impact of such policy on banks of different ownership. 
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2.2. Monetary policy 
 
The authority to implement monetary policy in India rests with the RBI. It was established 
under the Reserve Bank of India Act of 1934, as a private shareholders’ bank, and was 
subsequently nationalised in 1949. Unlike the Bank of England, which was formally granted 
independence in 1997, the RBI does not have de jure independence from the Government of 
India. However, with the phasing out of automatic monetisation of fiscal deficit by 1997 by 
way of ad hoc treasury bills, the central bank was granted de facto independence. There are 
strict limits on the ways and means advances by the RBI to the government, and the former 
does not participate in primary market auctions of government securities. While the RBI takes 
into cognizance the federal government’s views about the state of the economy, it de facto 
sets monetary policy independently. 
 
Originally, the bank rate and open market operations were the RBI’s instruments of choice for 
conducting monetary policy. In the seventies and eighties, with increased accommodation of 
the federal government’s fiscal policies by the central bank, these instruments lost their 
efficacy, and the CRR became the primary instrument for conducting monetary policy. In 
1998, in light of the realisation that in an increasingly complex environment broad money 
supply in the medium term cannot be the sole intermediate target of monetary policy, the RBI 
formally adopted a multifactor approach to monetary policy. This resulted in a focus on the 
use of short term interest rates as the instruments of monetary policy, facilitated by the 
deregulation of interest rates, which was initiated as early as 1989. The bank rate, therefore, 
made a comeback in 1997-98, and was complemented by the rates for reverse repo (and, from 
2000-01, repo) transactions. The repo and reverse repo rates have emerged as the primary 
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instruments of monetary policy since the turn of the century. The CRR, which was reduced 
steadily from 15 percent in the early nineties to 5 percent by 2004, has not completely been 
abandoned. It is still used in situations that demand significant monetary response, or when 
other monetary policy options have been exhausted. The use of all monetary policy 
instruments of the RBI are summarised in Table 1. 
 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
 
It is evident from Table 1 that it is difficult to select any one instrument as the indicator of 
monetary policy of the RBI. This poses a problem because empirical analysis requires the use 
of a single monetary policy signal; the US literature on the lending channel of monetary 
policy focuses on changes in the federal funds rate (Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000), while 
the European literature uses short-term interest rates (Erhmann et al., 2001) or the refinancing 
rate (Gambacorta, 2005). Fortunately, Indian banks declare their respective prime lending 
rates (PLR) – the rate at which they are prepared to lend to the most credit-worthy borrowers 
– that is linked to their cost of funds. The average PLR of the five largest banks is quoted by 
the RBI. Figure 1 demonstrates that movements of this average PLR closely replicates 
movements in the bank rate, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, also the repo and reverse repo 
rates. Hence, we use the average PLR reported by the RBI as the basis for our measure of 
monetary policy. We are not alone in our use of such constructs as the basis for the measure 
for monetary policy. In the British context, Huang (2003) use the average of the base rates of 
selected banks as the indicator of monetary policy, while Hofman and Mizen (2004) eschew 
the official Bank of England rate in favour of the average of the base rates of four major 
clearing banks. 
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[insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
3. Methodological issues 
 
In the traditional IS-LM model, a reduction in money supply is immediately translated into a 
higher equilibrium interest rate in the money market, and this in turn affects the real sector 
through a reduction in investment. On a bank’s balance sheet, a reduction in deposits on the 
liability side is matched by a reduction in the bank’s holding of bonds and loans on the asset 
side. If bonds and loans are perfect substitutes, as in the traditional Keynesian framework, 
there is a proportionate reduction in the bonds and loans portfolios. The impact of monetary 
policy on the asset composition of the banks (and the firms, the borrowers) is of no interest. 
 
Now, suppose that bonds and loans are imperfect substitutes. For example, at least some of 
the banks might find it easier to both build up and unwind their loans portfolios than their 
bonds portfolios. In the presence of such imperfections in capital market access, a 
contractionary monetary policy is likely to be followed by a much greater reduction in loan 
supply than in the sale of (or a drop in the demand for) bonds.
8
 The literature on the bank 
                                                 
8
 Alternatively, if bonds are safer than loans, which is often the case in developing countries 
where the main issuer of bonds are the sovereign governments, a monetary contraction 
initiated by a central bank might trigger a flight to the less risky asset, with banks downsizing 
their loans portfolios much more aggressively than their bonds portfolios (Bernanke, Gertler 
and Gilchrist, 1996; Ashcraft and Campello, 2002). This is the so-called balance sheet 
channel of monetary transmission that, together with the bank lending channel, comprises the 
credit channel of monetary policy transmission. 
 15 
lending channel of monetary policy transmission takes this change in the asset composition of 
banks into consideration.  
 
As discussed earlier in this paper, there can be considerable cross-sectional variation in the 
nature of bank’s reaction to monetary policy. Banks with strong linkages with their 
corresponding borrower pools, with resultant amelioration of the informational asymmetry 
and hence credit risk, might downsize (or reduce the growth of) their loan portfolios less in 
response to contractionary monetary policy than other banks. Similarly, less capitalised banks 
and smaller banks that find it more difficult to raise capital might cut back on lending (or 
reduce lending growth) far more than larger and well-capitalised banks. Since these cross-
sectional variations affect only the supply side of the loan market – the banks and not the 
firms that demand credit – they can be used to circumvent identification problem of empirical 
modelling the bank lending channel, i.e., distinguishing between the demand and supply side 
effects of monetary policy on the amount of loans disbursed.  
 
In keeping with the literature, the theoretical basis for which can be found in Ehrman et al. 
(2003) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), we model change in loans disbursed by bank i 
(yi) as a function of the change in the monetary policy instrument (MP) – the average PLR of 
the five largest Indian banks in our case. Given the aforementioned cross-sectional 
heterogeneity in banks’ response to monetary policy based on their characteristics, we control 
for three different bank characteristic in our specification, namely, liquidity (LIQ), 
capitalisation (CAP) and profitability (PROFIT). This is consistent with the stylised literature 
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(Gambacorta, 2005; Van den Heuvel, 2007).
9
 In light of the evidence that suggests that bank 
behaviour in India can be affected by whether or not it is subjected to market scrutiny 
(Bhaumik and Piesse, 2008), we also include in our specification a dummy variable 
(LISTING) that takes the value 1 if a bank is listed at one of the country’s stock exchanges. 
Finally, in order to further facilitate identification to distinguish between loan demand and 
loan supply, we include industrial growth (IND) that affects the demand for funds much more 
than banks’ behaviour.10 
 
Our base specification, therefore, is as follows: 
 yit =  + MPit-1 + 1CAPi,t-1 + 2LIQi,t-1 + 3PROFITi,t-1 + 4LISTINGi,t-1 
  + 5INDi,t-1 + i + it        [1] 
where t represents time, i is the bank-specific fixed effect and it is the i.i.d. error term. In the 
literature, bank lending models are usually estimated using quarterly data. Since a change in 
monetary policy in quarter t is likely to affect disbursal in bank loans with at least a one-
period lag, yit is modelled as a function of monetary policy in the previous four quarters. 
                                                 
9
 According to Van den Heuvel (2007), changes in bank profitability affects bank lending 
through the “bank capital” channel. According to this view, when bank profits decline, if 
equity capital is low, and it is costly to issue shares, banks may reduce lending. 
10
 In the literature, the controls for loan demand usually are GDP growth rate and the inflation 
rate, sometimes used together in the specification. However, there is evidence to suggest that 
in the Indian context bank’s behaviour is influenced more by industrial growth than by GDP 
growth (Bhaumik and Piesse, 2008), and hence our choice. We also experiment with 
specifications that included the inflation rate, in isolation as well as together with the 
industrial growth rate. The coefficient of inflation is never significant, and hence we do not 
report that specification in the paper. 
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However, in the Indian context, only annual data are available for banks, such that the time 
unit of analysis is a year, as opposed to a quarter. Therefore, we make the reasonable 
assumption that a change in monetary policy in a given year will affect loans disbursal with a 
lag, in the following year.
11
 Hence, we model yit as a function of MPi,t-1, the lagged change 
in the monetary policy instrument. 
 
For the empirical analysis, we amend this base specification in three ways. First, since we 
focus on the differences in the reactions of bank with different ownership to monetary policy, 
we interact bank ownership dummies with MPi,t-1. Second, we argue that a given change in 
interest rates cannot have the same impact in a tight and an easy monetary regime; a 50 basis 
point increase in the interest is likely to have a very different impact on loan disbursal when 
the initial value of the interest rate is (say) 8 percent, compared to the case when the initial 
value of the interest rate is (say) 2 percent. Hence, we further interact the MPi,t-1 variable 
with an indicator of the nature of the monetary regime. In other words, our regression 
estimates identify the impact of monetary policy on loan disbursal for banks of each 
ownership type, for both the easy and tight monetary regimes. In order to facilitate this 
process further, following Huang (2003), we include in the specification interaction between 
MPi,t-1 and indicators of both these type of regimes: a dummy variable MCI that takes the 
                                                 
11
 This assumption finds support in earlier research on monetary policy transmission in India 
that uses time series – quarterly data from 1996 through 2007 – data to examine the effects of 
an unanticipated monetary policy tightening on GDP, prices and overnight call money rate in 
India (Aleem, 2010). The VAR impulse responses reported in the study suggest that prices, 
output, and interest rate react significantly to monetary policy shocks and the bulk of the 
adjustment takes place about within 3 or 4 quarters following the policy tightening. 
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value 1 in an easy monetary regime, and its inverse IMCI that takes the value 1 in a tight 
monetary regime. The resultant specification is as follows: 
 yit = jj(IMCIt-1  MPi,t-1  OWNjit) + jj(MCI t-1  MPi,t-1  OWNjit)  
+ 1CAPi,t-1 + 2LIQi,t-1 + 3PROFITi,t-1 + 4LISTINGi,t-1 + 5INDi,t-1  
+ i + it         [2] 
where OWN is a dummy variable capturing type of bank ownership and j is the index of the 
types of bank ownership.  
 
We use panel unit root tests to ascertain that the continuous variables used in our regression 
specification are stationary.
12
 Our tests suggest that credit growth and industrial growth are 
trend stationary while the rest are stationary. We, therefore, add a time trend to the 
specifications of both the baseline (equation 1) and augmented (equation 2) models. 
Regression estimates from the baseline model, which we do not report in the paper, suggest 
that interest rate change and credit growth are inversely related. Estimates from the 
augmented model are discussed in the next section, where we also describe our data set. 
 
4.  Data and empirical results  
 
4.1. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
The data for the estimation are obtained from a number of sources. Bank balance sheets are 
obtained from the Indian Banks’ Association. Using these financial statements, we measure 
the change in loan disbursal by each bank during each financial year (yit). We measure CAP 
                                                 
12
 We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this aspect of the estimation 
process. 
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as the log of capital and reserves, LIQ as the log of liquid assets, and PROFIT as the return on 
assets. The information about year of stock exchange listing of banks is obtained from the 
Prowess database marketed by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy. The ownership 
types of the banks
13
 – public sector, old domestic private, new domestic private, and foreign – 
are obtained from the RBI. As mentioned earlier in the paper, the central bank is also the 
source for our measure of monetary policy. We measure MPit as the change in the 
aforementioned PLR between the beginning and end of a financial year. Finally, the 
indicators of easy and tight monetary regime are obtained from the estimates of monetary 
conditions index of Kannan et al. (2006). 
 
We include in our sample banks with at least two branches. This primarily leads to exclusion 
of foreign banks that have a solitary branch in India to finance trading activities of their 
                                                 
13
 The nature of public sector (or state-owned) and foreign banks are easily understood, even 
though it should be noted that private investors own minority shares in a number of public 
sector banks. The distinction between the two types of domestic private banks is more 
complex. The old domestic private banks were in operation much before the initiation of the 
financial reforms in the early 1990s. They were typically closely held, often by members of 
trading communities. Subsequent to the reforms, a few of these banks floated themselves on 
stock exchanges and expanded beyond their traditional geographical enclaves. The new 
private banks came into existence after the financial reforms paved the way for market entry 
for new banks. Many of them have links to large former or existing non-bank financial 
institutions. These de novo banks by and large have professional management, almost always 
are stock exchange listed, and have expanded their shares of the deposit and loans markets 
aggressively. For further details, see Sarkar, Sarkar and Bhaumik (1998) and Bhaumik and 
Dimova (2004). 
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respective client multinationals. We also exclude from our sample banks that experienced 
very large changes to their balance sheets, often on account of acquisition of non-banking 
assets of other financial organisations, or on account of financial distress. Our final sample 
consists of 58 banks, and the data covers the 2000-07 period, resulting in over 300 bank year 
observations. Of these, 24 are public sector banks, 21 are old private sector banks, 3 are new 
private sector banks and 10 are foreign banks. For our period of analysis, these banks account 
for over 80 percent of the total credit disbursed by all scheduled commercial banks.  
 
Summary statistics of the variables used in the regression model are reported in Table 2, and 
the following can be observed: First, interestingly, old private domestic banks are much 
smaller, on average, than the new private and foreign banks even though they have operated 
in India much longer than their new competitors. Further, a much smaller percentage of old 
private banks are listed on the stock exchanges than even state-owned banks.
14
 This is 
consistent with the observation, highlighted earlier in the paper, that these old private banks 
are generally closely held organisations with close links to various business and trading 
communities. Second, foreign banks are much better capitalised than domestic banks. The 
ratio of capital and reserves to total assets of foreign banks (9.3 percent) is nearly double that 
of state-owned banks (5.1 percent), old private banks (5.7 percent) and new private banks (5.4 
percent). This could imply either that foreign banks are in a better position to take risk, or that 
they are more risk averse. Third, the proportion of lending by way of securities such as 
corporate bonds and debentures is small, and similar across the different types of banks. 
Bonds and debentures account for 10.1 percent of lending of state-owned banks, 12.3 percent 
                                                 
14
 The percentage figures reported in Table 2 are period averages, and are not time invariant. 
However, throughout the sample period, more state-owned banks were stock exchange listed 
than their old private counterparts. 
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of lending of old private banks, 13.6 percent of lending of new private banks, and 11.5 
percent of lending of foreign banks. Finally, the ratio of small-term lending to medium-term 
lending of state-owned banks (1.08) and old private banks (1.14), a reasonable proxy for the 
risk appetite of the banks, is much lower than that of new private banks (1.66) and foreign 
banks (2.90).  
 
[insert Table 2 about here] 
 
4.2. Results and discussion 
 
4.2.1. Regression results 
 
The regression estimates for the basic model are reported in Table 3. The table should be read 
as follows: We use two different measures of credit disbursed. In columns (1) – (3), the 
measure for credit disbursed is “advances” made by banks to borrowers, while in columns (4) 
– (6) the measure is the sum of advances and “debentures” when the latter includes 
subscription to both short term securities like commercial paper and longer term securities 
like coupon bonds. Further, aside from estimating our model for the entire sample (columns 1 
and 4), we separately estimate the model for the public sector or state-owned banks (columns 
2 and 5) and all non-state sector banks (columns 3 and 6). There are 334 bank-year 
observations for the entire sample, of which 144 are for the public sector banks and 190 are 
for our mix of privately-owned banks. Our decision to pool together the different types of 
domestic and foreign private sector banks is based on the small sample size for new domestic 
banks and foreign banks. 
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[insert Table 3 about here] 
 
For each of these samples, and for each measure of credit disbursal, equation (2) is estimated 
using fixed effects models that control for time-invariant unobserved characteristics of the 
banks like their relationships with (and the quality of) the borrowers.
15
 The regression 
statistics reported in the last four rows of the table suggest that overall our model specification 
fits the data reasonably well. The F-statistics for all the columns are significant at the 1 
percent level, and the pseudo R-square values for the regression models are in the 0.10-0.26 
range. These R-square values indicate that our specification works better for the models that 
attempt to explain variations in advances alone, as opposed to variations in the sum of 
advances and subscriptions to debentures by the firms. Importantly, our results are robust 
across the choice of the measure of credit and the choice of the sample. 
 
Down the rows of Table 3, we first report the impact of monetary policy on the growth rate of 
credit disbursed by banks of different types of ownership in a tight money regime. These are 
the regression coefficients i in equation (2). Given that an increase in the interest rate in a 
tight money regime should lead to a decline in credit disbursal, we expect i to be negative. 
We next report the impact of monetary policy in the growth rate of credit disbursed by the 
different types of banks in an easy monetary regime. These are the regression coefficients i 
in equation (2). In an easy money regime, when the interest rate level is relatively low, credit 
                                                 
15
 We experiment by extending the specification in equation (2) to a dynamic panel 
framework, adding a lagged dependent variable to the list of explanatory variables. The 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is insignificant for both the fixed effects 
estimation and that involving the Arellano-Bond estimator. Hence, we drop the lagged 
dependent variable from the specification and returned to the specification in equation (2). 
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disbursal by banks may not be negatively affected by an increase in this interest rate. Indeed, 
if the monetary tightening in an easy money regime signals an attempt by the central bank to 
dampen the speed of expansion in a fast growing real economy, there might actually be an 
increase in borrowing in the near term, in anticipation of further rate rises in the future. 
Hence, we do not have any ex ante expectations about the signs of the estimated i. Finally, 
we report the coefficient estimates of the control variables. 
 
The regression results suggest that credit disbursal by both public sector banks and private 
sector banks is adversely affected by a tightening in monetary policy in a tight money regime, 
i.e., i < 0 for i  {public sector, old private sector, foreign}. To begin with, this demonstrates 
that, contrary to popular wisdom in the ownership literature, and in keeping with the literature 
on the Indian banking sector (Sarkar, Sarkar and Bhaumik, 1998; Bhaumik and Dimova, 
2004), public sector banks operate on the basis of market incentives. The much larger (and 
negative) response of credit disbursal by the foreign banks to monetary tightening, despite the 
fact that these banks typically have relationship with multinationals operating in India and 
blue chip domestic firms (Berger et al., 2008), demonstrates that these banks are quite risk 
averse when it comes to credit disbursal to emerging market entities. This could be on account 
of the fact that foreign banks often have disadvantages in obtaining and processing 
information about firms in overseas markets, especially when information is costly (Stein, 
2002). These banks also have a less diversified customer base in the host country and hence 
are more vulnerable to adverse shocks.  
 
Much more interesting is the fact that an interest rate increase in a tight money regime 
adversely affects credit disbursal by old private banks as well. These banks have historically 
had long term relationships with their customers, and hence are less vulnerable to adverse 
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selection. However, as demonstrated by Berger et al. (2008), most old private banks in India 
are community based and are concentrated geographically,
16
 and hence their customer base is 
not well diversified. This might explain the behaviour of these banks during tight money 
regimes. Given the small sample for new private banks, it is difficult to draw general 
conclusions about these banks.  
 
The coefficient estimates for i, which capture the impact of monetary policy on credit 
disbursal by banks during easy money periods, are entirely consistent with the estimates for 
i. During easy money periods, a monetary policy induced change in the interest rate has a 
weak impact on credit disbursal by public sector banks (column 4) and none on the disbursal 
by foreign banks, but there is a noticeable increase in the disbursal of credit by old private 
banks. (Once again, for the reason mentioned above, we ignore the coefficient estimate for the 
new private banks.) In other words, if the interest rate is low, monetary tightening does not 
affect the credit disbursal of banks that are at an informational disadvantage – the public 
sector and foreign banks – because the interest rate is low to begin with. However, old private 
banks for whom the problem of informational asymmetry is not acute, lend more, on average, 
                                                 
16
 For example, as late as 2009, 17 years after liberalisation of branching regulations, while 
Karur Vyasya Bank has 183 offices in Tamil Nadu and 69 in the neighbouring state of Andhra 
Pradesh, it has a total of 36 offices in the fairly large and high growth-high income states of 
Delhi, Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra and Punjab (Group 1). The bank has a total of three 
branches in the large (but lower income) states of Bihar, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Rajasthan, 
Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal (Group 2). Similarly, the Dhanalakshmi Bank has 127 offices 
in Kerala and 27 in the neighbouring state of Tamil Nadu, but a total of 12 offices in the 
Group 1 states and a total of 1 office in the Group 2 states. 
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possibly accommodating greater demand for credit in anticipation of further rate increases in 
the future. 
 
Of the control variables, capital adequacy has a negative (albeit statistically weak) impact on 
credit disbursal of state-owned or public sector banks. Liquidity does not affect credit 
disbursal in any way. This contrasts with the literature on developed countries where capital 
adequacy is generally positively correlated with bank lending, and where liquidity has an 
impact on lending as well (Thakor, 1996; Jackson et al., 1999). Growth of credit disbursal is 
affected by demand for credit, as captured by industrial growth. And lending increases with 
profitability of private banks, even though profitability of public sector banks does not have 
any impact on credit. Given that our fixed effects model controls for the (arguably time 
invariant) quality of the borrowers, this suggests that private banks lend more if they have 
greater ability to absorb adverse shocks by way of loan defaults. 
 
Next, we distinguish between less risky short term loans, those with maturity less than one 
year, and medium term loans, those with maturity of 1-3 years. We ignore long term loans 
because they constitute a very small proportion of the loan portfolio of most Indian banks. 
Since the results reported in Table 3 are robust to the measure of credit, for this exercise we 
use advances as our measure of credit. The regression estimates for these models are reported 
in Table 4. As before, we estimate the model for the sample of all banks and sub-samples of 
public sector and private sector banks. The F-statistics are significant once again, albeit at the 
5 percent level. There is a sharp reduction in the pseudo R-square values. However, as we 
shall see, the results are quite suggestive. 
 
[insert Table 4 about here] 
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We find that in a tight money regime a further monetary tightening by the central bank leads 
to a decline in disbursal of both short term and medium term credit by public sector, old 
private and foreign banks. The result is especially strong for foreign banks. Further, the 
decline in credit disbursal by foreign banks is much larger for medium term advances than for 
short term advances. This is entirely consistent with the fact that medium term loans are more 
risky. Interestingly, while there is a sharp contraction of short term advances made by state-
owned banks and old private banks in the tight money regime, there is no statistically 
significant impact on medium term advances. A plausible explanation for this is that the pool 
of borrowers that receive short term credit from these banks is more risky than the pool of 
borrowers that receive medium term credit.
17
 As before, in the easy money regime, a 
monetary tightening leads to an increase in credit disbursed by old private banks. However, 
the increase in credit disbursed is restricted to short term loans; there is no impact on medium 
term loans. Interestingly, the differentiation between short term and medium term advances 
demonstrates that while the impact of monetary tightening in easy money regimes on overall 
credit disbursal by public sector banks is weak or insignificant (see Table 3), such tightening 
has positive impact on disbursal of short term loans.  
 
4.2.2. Discussion 
 
                                                 
17
 Data permitting, it would be interesting to discover whether this increase in disbursal of 
medium term credit is directed towards public sector enterprises with respect to whom public 
sector banks may have an informational advantage, or whether it is directed to the entire range 
of borrowers. 
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Overall, there is support for the view that monetary tightening by the central bank leads to a 
reduction in credit disbursal by Indian banks, albeit only in tight monetary regimes. Given 
that public sector banks, old private banks and foreign banks account for nearly 90 percent of 
the banking assets (and loan portfolio) in India, the bank lending channel of monetary policy 
transmission in India can be viewed as being fairly active during tight monetary regimes. In 
easy monetary regimes, however, monetary tightening can have the perverse effect of 
increasing credit disbursal. However, much of this increase in credit would be in the form of 
short term loans, thereby limiting its impact on the real sector.  
 
Importantly, there are significant differences in the reaction of banks of different ownership to 
monetary policy actions of the central bank. Foreign banks are by far the most risk averse. 
They react to monetary tightening during tight money regimes by sharply reducing credit 
disbursal, and the decline is much greater for riskier medium term loans than for relatively 
safe short term loans. This is in sharp contrast to the behaviour of foreign banks in Latin 
America where they are much less responsive to changes in monetary policy (Arena, Reinhart 
and Vasquez, 2006). State-owned banks and old private banks also curtail credit during these 
periods, albeit by a much smaller magnitude, but there is evidence – weaker for state-owned 
banks than for old private banks – to suggest that they may actually extend more (short-term) 
credit following monetary policy tightening during easy money regimes. However, the 
observed similarity of response of the state-owned and old private banks masks the difference 
in the challenge that they face. State-owned banks have a large banking network throughout 
the country – a legacy of their social objectives – and hence have a geographically diversified 
portfolio. The old private banks are much more concentrated geographically and hence their 
loan portfolios are vulnerable to shocks affecting specific states and regions. But their 
 28 
community based existence reduces informational asymmetry vis-a-vis the borrowers relative 
to other types of banks. We discuss the policy implications of this in the concluding section. 
 
One implication of our results is that the new private banks, which protect their customers 
from the effects of contractionary monetary policy initiatives during tight money regimes, 
charge their customers higher interest rates in steady state (Berger and Udell, 1992). This is 
an interesting hypothesis that, unfortunately, cannot be tested without access to loan contract 
level data from the different types of banks. Each Indian bank declares a prime lending rate, 
no publicly available archive for which exists, but the actual interest rate charged by the bank 
can vary significantly in both directions. Borrowers with low credit worthiness can pay 
significant premium over the prime lending rate, while credit is often offered to blue chip 
borrowers at sub-prime lending rates. 
 
Thus far, we have discussed the direction of change in advances made by the different types 
of banks, under different monetary conditions, tight or easy. How economically meaningful, 
however, is the impact of monetary policy initiatives, wherever statistically significant? 
Consider the results reported in Table 3. The regression coefficients reported in columns (1) 
suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in PLR in a tight money regime would reduce 
advances made by state-owned banks by 16 percent, and advances made by foreign banks by 
42 percent.
18
 Given the mean advances reported in Table 2, this would indicate a total 
                                                 
18
 As highlighted by Figure 1, the PLR, our proxy for the policy rate, did not change by more 
than 1 percentage point during the 2001-2007 estimation period. At the same time, India 
experienced double digit credit growth annually, sometimes in excess of 20 percent. Our 
ceteris paribus estimates of banks’ reactions to interest rate changes are, therefore, entirely 
plausible.  
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reduction in advances by approximately INR 6,244 billion. If instead we take into 
consideration the coefficients reported in columns (2) and (3), a 1 percentage point increase in 
PLR in a tight money regime will indicate a reduction in advances by approximately INR 
5,500 billion. 
 
This estimated economic impact may have significant policy implications, if firms have 
exclusive relationships with banks that act as their creditors.
19
 The Berger et al. (2008) 
analysis suggests that this is likely to be the case. It demonstrates that multiple banking 
relationships are more likely for firms that have banking relationships with foreign banks, that 
account for a tiny proportion of the Indian credit market. By contrast, firms that have 
relationships with public sector banks that account for over 70 percent of the credit market are 
much less likely to have multiple banking relationships, and also less likely to have 
relationships with different (bank) ownership types. Recall also that old private banks are 
generally community-based such that, by their very nature, they are likely to account for a 
very large proportion of banking relationships within their respective communities. 
 
In order to further verify that banks and their customers have an exclusive relationship, we 
undertake the following exercise. From the widely used Prowess data set, we obtain bank 
relationship data for 2114 firms for whom such data are available for at least three successive 
years. If the starting year for the data on bank relationship for a firm is t, we check whether 
the firm retains relations with at least x percent of these banks in the final year of availability 
of bank relationship data t+j, when j  3 and x = {50, 75, 100}. Our data suggests that over 
the period for which data are available, the majority of the firms have relationships with 
similar types of banks, e.g., public sector or private sector. Further, 76.7 percent of the firms 
                                                 
19
 We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this issue. 
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retain relationship with at least 50 percent of the banks, 61.5 percent retain relationship with 
at least 75 percent of the banks, and 57 percent retain relationships with all the banks with 
which they had relationship in the first year of availability of the data. While this is an 
imperfect test, and the exact degree of exclusivity is difficult to ascertain, our exercise 
suggests that bank relationships in India are fairly strong. Indeed, firms included in Prowess 
are larger than the average Indian firm, and many of them are listed on the stock exchanges, 
enabling them to signal credibly to a wider range of credit providers. The average Indian firm 
is likely to find it much more difficult to switch creditors, especially to and from the dominant 
public sector banks where past volume of sanctioned credit is a key current volume of credit 
(Banerjee et al., 2005), such that the aforementioned figures of 76.7 percent, 61.5 percent and 
57.8 percent are significant underestimates of the strength of banking relationships in India. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
There is a fairly large literature on the bank lending channel of monetary policy. But much of 
this literature is in the context of the United States, Europe and other developed economies 
where the banks are heterogeneous but are almost entirely in private sector. The emerging 
market economies, by contrast, have their fair share of state-owned banks, such that, in these 
contexts, the implications of ownership for the bank lending channel remains an important, 
yet largely unexplored, policy consideration. In this paper we address this issue, using bank-
level data from India.  
 
Our results suggest that there are considerable differences in the reactions of different types of 
banks to monetary policy initiatives of the central bank. During periods of tight monetary 
policy, as captured by the monetary conditions index, state-owned banks, old private banks 
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and foreign banks curtail credit in response to an increase in interest rate. The reaction of 
foreign banks is particularly sharp. The reaction of the new private banks is not statistically 
significant. By contrast, during easy money periods, an increase in interest rates by the central 
bank leads to an increase in the growth of credit disbursed by old private banks, with no 
significant reactions from other types of banks. The regression results also indicate that the 
adverse reaction to a policy initiated increase in interest rate in a tight monetary regime is 
much greater for medium term borrowing than for short term borrowing. 
 
Our results have two significant implications for the literature on bank lending channel. First, 
it suggests that the bank lending channel of monetary policy might be much more effective in 
a tight money period than in an easy money period. In other words, if interest rates are low, 
then a central bank that desires monetary contraction may have to raise the rate substantially 
to witness an impact on money supply through the bank lending channel. This has 
implications for future analyses of the bank lending channel; the condition under which a 
central bank changes its policy rate should be explicitly taken into account. It has also 
implications for the implementation of monetary policy strategies during a business cycle 
period or economic crisis. For example, if the economy is going through a downturn and the 
authorities try to stimulate the economy towards the recovery zone, then, depending upon the 
type of money regime the economy is in, the policymakers need to consider making 
adjustments in policy rates to get the desired effects. Second, the bank lending channel is 
likely to function much better if the lending relationships pose significant risk for the banks, 
whether because of arms length relationship with the borrowers that result in greater 
informational asymmetry, or because of significant geographical concentration of borrowers 
that increases the systematic risk of the loan portfolios. The implication of the risk of adverse 
selection for monetary policy transmission is especially interesting. If banks are relatively 
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small and closely tied to their borrower base, monetary policy initiatives may have limited 
impact because the likelihood of adverse selection may not increase significantly. This has 
implications for the post-crisis debate about the size of banks and their relationship with 
borrowers. 
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Table 1. RBI monetary policy operations 
Year Bank rate (%) CRR (%) REPO (%)
a
 Reverse REPO (%)
b
 
 1 April 31 March No. of 
changes 
1 April 31 March No. of 
changes 
1 April 31 March No. of 
changes 
1 April 31 
March 
No. of 
changes 
1996-1997 12 12 0 14 10 7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1997-1998 12 10.5 5 10 10.25 5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.5** 8 5 
1998-1999 10.5 8 3 10.25 10.5 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 8 6 5 
1999-2000 8 8 0 10.5 9 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 6 10 4 
2000-2001 8 7 4 9 8 6 11.5% 9 6 10 6 5 
2001-2002 7 6.5 1 8 5.5 3 9 8 5 6 5 6 
2002-2003 6.5 6.25 1 5.5 4.75 2 8 7 4 5 4.5 1 
2003-2004 6.25 6 1 4.75 4.5 1 6 6 1 4.5 4.75 1 
2004-2005 6 6 0 4.5 5 3 6 6 0 4.75 4.75 0 
2005-2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 5 5 1 6 6.5 2 4.75 5.5 3 
2006-2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 5 5.5 1 6.5 7.75 5 5.5 6 2 
Source: RBI Annual Reports 
Note: 
a
 Started in June 2000 
b
 Started on 27 November 1997 
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Table 2. Summary statistics by bank ownership, 2001-2007  
Bank characteristics  State-owned 
banks 
Old private 
banks 
New private 
banks 
Foreign 
banks 
Total assets Mean 52846.43 5313.31 15310.06 11366.03 
 Std. Dev. 75552.61 5057.44 11249.78 12348.29 
Capital and reserves Mean   2712.99   310.97      805.39   1064.45 
 Std. Dev.   3822.87   330.54       698.88   1155.07 
Liquid assets Mean 24919.87 2373.86     6598.75   4110.85 
 Std. Dev. 37765.82 2281.62     4833.27   4398.47 
Advances Mean 23474.70 2539.87     6760.65   5507.03 
 Std. Dev. 32289.41 2612.82     4947.37   6231.61 
Advances, debentures and 
bonds Mean 26117.14 2903.14     7862.60   6227.34 
 Std. Dev. 34877.70 2998.19     5647.44   6825.87 
Short-term advances Mean   8926.75 1083.31     3163.74   3449.37 
 Std. Dev. 12004.92 1121.86     1573.01   3473.09 
Medium-term advances Mean   8206.03    935.35     1962.50   1183.47 
 Std. Dev. 11223.34 1075.81     1998.47   1815.21 
Return on assets Mean          0.96        0.92           0.17         1.75 
 Std. Dev.          0.78        1.61           3.00         1.85 
Listing on stock exchanges Mean          0.65        0.47           0.67         1.00 
 Std. Dev.          0.47        0.50           0.48         0 
Note: All level variables are in billions of Indian rupees. Liquid assets include cash, balances with RBI and other 
banks, money at call and short notice, government and other approved securities. Short-term means less than 1 
year and medium-term means from 1 year up to 3 years. 
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Table 3. Impact of monetary policy on credit disbursal 
 
Dependent variable: log change in advances Dependent variable: log change in 
advances and debentures 
 All banks State-owned Private sector All banks State-owned Private 
sector 
 (1) (2) (3) 
(4) (5) (6) 
Tight money regime       
Change in interest rate x Public sector banks - 0.167*** - 0.106**  - 0.135 ** - 0.084 *  
   (0.053)   (0.044)    (0.052)   (0.048)  
Change in interest rate x Old private sector 
banks 
- 0.079  - 0.141 ** - 0.075 *  - 0.124 ** 
   (0.05)    (0.06)   (0.046)    (0.056) 
Change in interest rate x New private sector 
banks 
- 0.103  - 0.168 - 0.145  - 0.197 
   (0.184)    (0.196)   (0.147)    (0.162) 
Change in interest rate x Foreign banks - 0.422 ***  - 0.482 *** - 0.36 ***  - 0.411 *** 
   (0.094)    (0.01)   (0.104)    (0.116) 
Easy regime       
Change in interest rate x Public sector banks   0.09   0.041    0.166 **   0.163  
   (0.06)   (0.06)    (0.082)   (0.103)  
Change in interest rate x Old private sector 
banks 
  0.158 ***    0.193 ***   0.177 ***    0.194 *** 
   (0.059)    (0.07)   (0.058)    (0.069) 
Change in interest rate x New private sector 
banks 
  0.109    0.085   0.063    0.035 
   (0.279)    (0.248)   (0.22)    (0.196) 
Change in interest rate x Foreign banks   0.06    0.125   0.097    0.133 
   (0.137)    (0.131)   (0.143)    (0.133) 
Control variables       
Capital - 0.085 - 0.44 *   0.099 - 0.091 - 0.424 *   0.06 
   (0.137)   (0.252)   (0.068)   (0.13)   (0.242)   (0.086) 
Liquidity - 0.071   0.005 - 0.084 - 0.054   0.052 - 0.072 
   (0.059)   (0.108)   (0.064)   (0.054)   (0.119)   (0.057) 
Return on assets   0.054 **   0.029   0.05 **   0.053 **   0.068   0.048 ** 
   (0.024)   (0.051)   (0.024)   (0.014)   (0.055)   (0.024) 
Industrial growth   0.056 ***   0.033 **   0.08 ***   0.052 ***   0.026 *   0.074 *** 
   (0.014)   (0.015)   (0.02)   (0.013)   (0.015)   0.02 
Stock exchange listing   0.008 - 0.006   0.038   0.027   0.004   0.047 
   (0.023)   (0.029)   (0.041)   (0.025)   (0.024)   (0.049) 
Time trend -0.017*   0.013 - 0.036 *** - 0.016 *   0.017 - 0.038 *** 
   (0.009)   (0.01)   (0.012)   (0.009)   (0.023)   (0.013) 
F-statistic   5.6   11.9   2.62   4.11   5.75   8.39 
Prob(F-stat>0)   0.00   0.00   0.014   0.00   0.00   0.00 
R-squared   0.124   0.268   0.192   0.105   0.205   0.174 
No. of observations   334   144   190   334   144   190 
Note:  The values in parentheses are robust standard errors   
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 4.  Impact of monetary policy on disbursal of short and medium term credit 
 
Dependent variable: log change in short 
term advances 
Dependent variable: log change in 
medium term advances 
 
All banks State-owned Private 
sector 
All banks State-
owned 
Private 
sector 
 (1) (2) (3) 
(4) (5) (6) 
Tight money regime       
Change in interest rate x Public sector banks - 0.297 *** - 0.212 *  - 0.264 * - 0.05  
   (0.107)   (0.108)    (0.149)   (0.124)  
Change in interest rate x Old private sector 
banks 
- 0.226 **  - 0.313 ** - 0.157  - 0.263 
   (0.112)    (0.128)   (0.188)    (0.249) 
Change in interest rate x New private sector 
banks 
- 0.003  - 0.092 - 0.353  - 0.448 
   (0.315)    (0.326)   (0.436)    (0.467) 
Change in interest rate x Foreign banks - 0.498 ***  - 0.595 *** - 0.98 ***  - 1.054 *** 
   (0.141)    (0.168)   (0.333)    (0.326) 
Easy regime       
Change in interest rate x Public sector banks   0.205 **   0.251 *    0.35 **   0.099  
   (0.096)   (0.14)    (0.156)   (0.193)  
Change in interest rate x Old private sector 
banks 
  0.399 **    0.431 **   0.268    0.40 
   (0.164)    (0.175)   (0.335)    (0.367) 
Change in interest rate x New private sector 
banks 
- 0.04  - 0.007   0.604    0.594 
   (0.28)    (0.31)   (0.522)    (0.473) 
Change in interest rate x Foreign banks - 0.138  - 0.113   0.55    0.715 
   (0.442)    (0.5)   (0.735)    (0.787) 
Control variables       
Capital - 0.006 - 0.218 - 0.002   0.305   0.224 **   0.61 
   (0.131)   (0.189)   (0.2)   (0.269)   (0.096)   (0.422) 
Liquidity - 0.017 - 0.086 - 0.017 - 0.46 ** - 0.062 - 0.494 * 
   (0.074)   (0.204)   (0.075)   (0.23)   (0.228)   (0.264) 
Return on assets   0.054 **   0.192   0.042 ** - 0.026 - 0.161 - 0.01 
   (0.022)   (0.125)   (0.012)   (0.029)   (0.153)   (0.027) 
Industrial growth   0.099 ***   0.029   0.149 ***   0.063   0.036   0.069 
   (0.024)   (0.019)   (0.037)   (0.045)   (0.035)   (0.078) 
Stock exchange listing - 0.022   0.037 - 0.217 - 0.004 - 0.306 *   0.606 
   (0.119)   (0.052)   (0.253)   (0.254)   (0.166)   (0.419) 
Time trend - 0.069 ***   0.004 - 0.123 ***   0.019   0.009   0.048 
   (0.025)   (0.018)   (0.037)   (0.043)   (0.037)   (0.069) 
F-statistic   2.87   3.60   3.25   4.2   2.41   4.21 
Prob(F-stat>0)   0.00   0.03   0.00   0.00   0.047   0.00 
R-square   0.064   0.083   0.066   0.056   0.013   0.039 
No. of observations   319   135   184   319   135   184 
Note:  The values in parentheses are robust standard errors  
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively  
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Figure 1. Movement of prime lending rate and other policy rates 
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